Designing secure RFID protocols for EPC Gen2V2 Standard is a challenging work. To solve the problems, recently many mutual authentication protocols have been proposed. However, many of them do not maintain synchrony of the records every interrogation. In this paper, we analyze the recently proposed RFID authentication protocols and show that there is the weakness. And we propose a new mutual authentication protocol for EPC Gen2V2 Standard to maintain synchrony. Furthermore, we analyze our protocol from security and privacy, and it shows that the proposed protocol is secure and effective.
INTRODUCTION
Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is a small, inexpensive microchip that emits an identifier in response to a query from a nearby reader [1] . And it is a promising new technology that is envisioned to replace barcodes and to be massively deployed for inventory management, supply chain and so on. However these tags bring security and privacy issues. These attacks are rendered more practicable due to the tags' restricted computation and storage capacity. Therefore, authentication protocols for RFID systems should not only be designed to address these privacy and security threats, but also should take into account the limited capabilities of RFID tags.
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Guiyue Jin, Jiyu Jin, Baoying Li, Jun Mou, Peng Li, Xin Zhao, Zhisen Wang are with the School of Information Science & Engineering, Dalian Polytechnic University, No.1 Qinggongyuan, Ganjingzi, Dalian, Liaoning, China. E-mail: guiyue.jin@dlpu.edu.cn, jiyu.jin@dlpu.edu.cn. Affiliation: Dalian Polytechnic University A typical RFID system involves three types of legitimate entities: A back-end server, readers and tags [2] . The most common low cost tags are passive tags that have no power of their own and get power from the radio waves of the reader. This kind of tags cannot perform public key cryptographic operations and are restricted to inexpensive conventional operations. Tags can only communicate with readers in wireless channels which are particularly vulnerable to attack. And many of tags can implement lightweight protection due to limited resource.
The EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard version 2 has been ratified recently [3] . Same as the previous standard, the new EPC Gen2V2 supports the use of a pseudo random number generator (PRNG), a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) function, and XOR operation. Since there are only 500-5000 gate elements on the tag, 200-2000 gate can be used for security-related functions [4] . For example, The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) requires about 3000 gate elements to be implemented. Hash functions like MD5 and SHA-256 require even more gate elements, 8000-10000 [5] . Therefore, securing information among RFID devices is a major challenge due to the limited storage and computational capabilities on the passive tags.
In RFID systems, because an adversary can monitor all messages transmitted in wireless communication between a reader and a tag, an adversary is able to attack RFID systems using tag information privacy, traceability, eavesdropping, message interception, impersonation and so on.
RELATED WORK
There have been many papers [6] , [7] and [8] in the literature that attempt to address security and privacy raised by the use of RFID tags. But all of the above mentioned protocols do not conform to o EPC Gen2V2 Standard RFID tags. Duc et al. [9] propose a mutual authentication protocol to solve problems of security and privacy based communication protocol for the EPC global Class 1 Gen-2 RFID tag. It uses a pseudo-random number generator and a Cyclic Redundancy Code. Unfortunately, the scheme is incomplete as it cannot support automatic re-synchronization when a message is lost between a tag and a back-end server by communication error, as well as message blocking by an adversary. It cannot prevent replay attacks before the next successful authentication. A mutual authentication protocol for RFID conforming to the EPC Class 1 Gen-2 standards is proposed by Chien and Chen [10] . Their scheme consists of two phases: an initialization phase and authentication phase. The scheme still permits backward and forward traceability, because a strong attacker that compromises a tag can identify a tag's past interactions from the previous communications and the fixed EPC of the tag, and can also read the tag's future transactions. Moreover, an adversary can successfully masquerade as an authorized server to a tag if it has the tag secrets. A new mutual authentication protocol compliant to EPC Class-1 Generation-2 RFID tags is proposed by Chen et al. [11] . The reader sends the request to the tag with the special tag's information, so this protocol need authenticate huge times in order to confirm a tag. In [12] , an attacker can obtain the past information after some formula derivation due to design weaknesses. Yoon's [13] has higher communication overhead. Lin et al.'s [14] has inefficient authentication procedure. The protocol proposed by S. Edelev et al. [15] is still vulnerable to certain security and privacy attacks.
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a novel mutual authentication protocol that provides security and privacy for the new EPC Gen2V2 standard.
To address the security risks of low-cost RFID tags, we will first state a set of assumptions about the operation of the system. RFID tags operate under severe restrictions compared to most personal computers, or even most embedded systems.
First, an RFID tag is powered only when within range of a reader. This means that the tag has only an extremely limited amount of time to carry out computation. Precomputation of results is impossible during times when the tag is out of range. We assume that our computation is possible when the tag is within range of a reader. Second, we assume that the proposed protocol is based on EPC Gen2V2 standard RFID tags. Third, the volume of data stored in a tag should be minimized because of the very limited size of tag memory [16] . According to EPC Gen2v2 standard RFID tags, reserved memory is used to store secret identification and secret key. Regarding the implementation, our proposed protocol requires some memory for tag's working memory. As specified in [11] , the specification defines a spare memory bank for userspecific purpose which can be used by our proposed protocol. Finally, in our proposed protocol, the communication channel is unsafe between the reader and the tag.
Before describing the protocol in detail, we give the symbols description that we use in the description of our protocol in the following TABLE I. Our protocol is represented by Figure 1 . The detailed description is shown as follows: A. Initialization phase: In system initialization, the back-end server generates an authentication identifier SID0, an authentication key Sk0, a timestamp TS0 and a random number Rr0 for each tag. The back-end server maintains a set of data for each When the reader queries the tag, the reader has to be authenticated first by the server. It is possible to perform the complicated encrypted algorithm between the reader and the server. So we assume that the communication channel is safe between the reader and the server. After the reader is authenticated by the server, the following steps are performed.
Step1 SR: the back-end server generates a random number Rr using the function PRNG( ) and computes Ms = Grpk⊕Rr. Then the server sends Ms to the reader.
Step2 RT: the reader forwards the received Message Ms and Query to the tag.
Step3 TR: after receiving the message Ms from the reader, the tag computers Rr=Ms⊕Grpk. And the tag computes M1=SKi⊕SIDi⊕Rr and M2=TSi⊕EPC⊕ Grpk. The tag then sends Ms, M1 and M2 to the reader.
Step4 RS: the reader forwards the received Message M1 and M2 to the server.
Step5: after receiving the messages Ms, M1 and M2, the back-end server sequentially searches the stored data of each tag owing to the Grpk to compute Rr'= M1⊕SIDi⊕ SKi. Once the server successfully identifies a matching record while Rr' is equal to Rr, the server computers M2'= TSi⊕EPC⊕Grpk using the matched record. If M2' is equal to M2, it is convinced that the received messages are sent from a real legitimate tag. Otherwise, the tag is not authenticated and the session pauses. C. Initialization phase: After the back-end server and the tag finish the authenticate each other, the data stored in the back-end server and the tag have to be updated. The following steps are performed.
Step 1 SR: the back-end server stores the Rr to Rri for the session I to the corresponding record. And it computes Ack = Rr⊕TSi⊕SIDi and sends it to the reader.
Step2 RT: the reader forwards the received Message Ack to the tag.
Step3 TR: after receiving the message Ack from the reader, the tag computers Ack' = Rr⊕TSi⊕SIDi. If Ack' is equal to Ack, the tag computes and updates SIDi+1= SIDi⊕Rr, SKi+1=SKi⊕Rr, TSi+1= TSi+1. And the tag computes and sends M3= SIDi+1⊕SKi+1⊕TSi+1 to the reader. Step4 RS: the reader forwards the received Message M3 to the server.
Step5: after receiving the messages M3, the server computes SIDi+1= SIDi⊕Rr, SKi+1=SKi⊕Rr, TSi+1= TSi+1.andM3'= SIDi+1⊕SKi+1⊕TSi+1.If M3' is equal to M3, the server updates the record and deletes Rri according to the matched record. Otherwise, the server does not update the record.
ANALYSIS
Our protocol can protect the information privacy. The detailed information of the tag is stored in the back-end server's database, which is assumed to be secure.Areader only authenticated by the server can sends a query and correct group information to the tag. So the attacker which is not authenticated by the server cannot acquire the group information. Even if the attacker catches the message M1 and M2, the attacker cannot know any useful information and also cannot get the sensitive tag data.
Our protocol can prevent traceability. In order to guarantee location privacy through refreshed value, our protocol uses the new random nonce Rr in each session to compute the communication messages. So response message of the tag is not easy to be linked to any particular tag. In other words, the eavesdropper cannot link tag responses to previous responses from the same tag, and cannot distinguish one tag's response from other's response. Therefore, even if the attacker eavesdrops, the attacker cannot know the user's location.
The replay attack belongs to impersonation attack. In our protocol, replay attack can be prevented. Because every query from the reader sends the message Ms using a random nonce Rr to the tag, due to the difference of the random nonce, the attack sends the previous communication messages to the back-end server, the back-end server also cannot authorized the tag, because the back-end server generates new random nonce Rr for each new session. Using this new random nonce cannot decrypt the previous messages correctly, so the tag authentication is impossible. From the analysis, it can be drawn that the proposed protocol can prevent replay attack.
Message interception can cause the de-synchronization. The de-synchronization problem can be prevented in our proposed protocol. There are three situations after a session. First, if the operation in session i successes, the data in the back-end server and the tag is synchronous. Second if the tag does not receive Ack message, the record between the server and the tag is synchronous too because information update phase has not performed. Third, if the tag receives Ack message and updates the record, and the back-end server does not receive the message M3 and does not update the corresponding record, i.e. the record in the back-end server is in session i-1 and the record in the tag in session i. after a new session begins, when the server receives the message M1 and M2, it computes Rr'= M1⊕SIDi⊕SKior computes Rr'= M1⊕(SIDi ⊕Rri)⊕(SKi⊕Rri) when the server finds the Rri is not null. If the Rr is equal to M1⊕ (SIDi⊕Rri)⊕(SKi⊕Rri) and (M2⊕EPC⊕Grpk-1) equals to TSi in the server, it shows that the record in the server belongs to session i-1 and the server updates SIDi= SIDi⊕Rri, SKi=SKi⊕Rr, TSi= TSi+1 and delete Rri before the following regular process. So the proposed protocol always keeps synchronous in any situation. From the analysis, we can realize that the data in the tag always updates first, so the server can keep synchronous using the prior random number stored in the server.
Our proposed protocol is not fully secure, and it suffers from exhaustive-key attacks. It is a tradeoff between an expensive and a completely secure protocol and a simple, conforming to EPC Gen2V2 RFID protocol. But for scenario using cheap passive tag conforming to EPC Gen2V2 RFID tags, our proposed protocol is secure and practical. It is known that our proposed protocol can resolve privacy, traceability, impersonation and synchronization. And the proposed protocol has low computation complexity due to researching time in group Grpk.
SUMMARY
In this paper, we have proposed a new authentication protocol compliant to EPC Gen2V2 RFID tags. We have reviewed related previous works conforming to EPC Gen2V2 RFID tags as well as other security protocols. The proposed protocol is computationally light-weight, and anonymously interacts between entities. It basically fits ubiquitous computing environment. Our proposed protocol is robust enough since a tag emits its information only after reader authentication. By refreshing a message transmitted from a tag in each session it can prevent traceability and it is secure against many attacks such as impersonation and replay attack even if the reader is not a trusted third party.
Our proposed protocol can decrease the searching burden of the back-end server, because every tag is assigned to a special group. When the reader is authenticated by the back-end server, the back-end server sends the message Ms which includes the group authority. So the searching time decreases much. In this protocol, time stamp TSi is also used to check synchronization.
Furthermore, we compare our proposed protocol with other protocols which are compliant to EPC Gen2V2 RFID tags with respect to the privacy and security properties. It is clear that the proposed protocol overcomes de-synchronization problems mentioned in this paper.
